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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

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FM USMISSION NATO

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3764

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: FRG PAPER ON RELATIONSHIP OF MANPOWER TO
TANKS

FRG DELEGATION HAS GIVEN US TEXT OF FRG PAPER ON RELATIONSHIP OF
MANPOWER TO MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS PAPER, WHICH ALSO WENT TO
TICKELL IN LONDON AND AMBASSADOR RESOR, WAS ONLY SENT INFO TO FRG
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WITH AUTHORIZATION FOR EMBASSY TO GIVE IT
TO U.S. AUTHORITIES IF IT DEEMED IT APPROPRIATE. WE ARE THEREFORE
TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE FRG PAPER IN EVENT FRG EMBASSY DOES
NOT DELIVER IT IN WASHINGTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

--- INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF AVAILABLE
MEN AND COMBAT-READY MAIN BATTLE TANKS ---

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ROEM1 1. THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 22,
1973, ENVISAGES I.A. THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH
1.700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS PROPOSAL IS TO REMAIN IN FORCE.
THE DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO OPTION 3 HAVE UNDERLINED THE

DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL LIMITATIONS.

2. IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT IN THE CASE OF A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF RESIDUAL SOVIET TANKS THE WP WILL DEMAND A LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF TANKS ON THE WESTERN SIDE. THIS WOULD LEAD TO A CODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING TANK DISPARITIES. WE MUST ALSO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE PROPOSAL "REDUCTION OF TANKS" INVOLVES THE COMPONENT "EQUIPMENT", WHICH IS A STANDING WP DEMAND. IT OPENS UP A POSSIBILITY FOR THE WP TO DEMAND RECIPROCITY IN THE FORM OF REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS IS ONE MORE REASON, WHY THE ALLIES MUST SEEK TO PREVENT A GENERALIZATION OF THE MBFR APPROACH IN THE DIRECTION OF INCLUDING EQUIPMENT.

3. SUCH A GENERALIZATION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR PRESENT NEGOTIATING CONCEPT AND TO WESTERN INTERESTS. IT WOULD AFFECT IN PARTICULAR THOSE STATES, WHOSE TERRITORY LIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. FOR THEM REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DISARMAMENT

A DISBANDMENT OF TANKS UNITS WOULD MOREOVER MEAN FOR THE FORCES INVOLVED A LOSS OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY. BOTH RESULTS WOULD BE AS UNACCEPTABLE AS THE CODIFICATION OF THE PACT'S TANK SUPERIORITY BY FREEZING THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF TANKS.

4. THE SITUATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF TANK CEILINGS WOULD ONLY BE AGREED FOR THE US AND SU ON THE BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS.

ANOTHER THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT ON TANK CEILINGS FOR BOTH SIDES ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WP TANK HOLDINGS. IN THIS CASE THE WEST WOULD MAINTAIN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL OPTION TO INCREASE ITS NUMBER OF TANKS.

5. BUT EVEN SUCH A GENERAL SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED AS REGARDS ITS EUROPEAN IMPLICATIONS. THE WP COULD REFER TO NATO'S (ESPECIALLY THE BUNDESWEHR'S) SUPERIORITY E.G. IN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS - FREQUENTLY PUBLISHED BUT IN FACT NOT EXISTING - AND COULD CALL FOR THE INCLUSION OF THESE SYSTEMS
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IN REDUCTION OR COMMON TANK CEILINGS AS A COUNTER WEIGHT TO WP TANK REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD MEAN A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS A GENERAL INCLUSION OF ALL CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS.

THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL ZONE, WHICH NATO REJECTS, ARE APPARENT.

6. ANY ARRANGEMENT FOR EUROPEAN NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS MUST TAKE THESE DIFFICULTIES INTO CONSIDERATION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT NEGATIVE EFFECTS FOR NATO CAN ONLY BE AVOIDED IF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION ARRANGEMENT FOR EUROPEAN SYSTEMS WILL BE ACHIEVED EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH A MANPOWER LIMITATION.

7. THE FOLLOWING REMARKS WHICH CONCENTRATE MAINLY ON THE

EFFECTS ON THE WP ARE INTENDED AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ELABORATION
OF A NATO POSITION PAPER ON THIS QUESTION.

8. ---EFFECTS OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATION ON THE
COMBAT READINESS OF TANK UNITS OF THE WP GROUND FORCES
IN THE NGA---

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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /083 W

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8. IN KEEPING WITH THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE WP, THE
ARMED FORCES OF A STATE AND IN LARGE MEASURE ALSO OF AN ALLIANCE
FORM A SYSTEM OF SUB-SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS WHICH ARE BALANCED
AND STRUCTURED ACCORDING TO THEIR OVERALL MISSION. THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAVE FREQUENTLY MADE MENTION OF THIS
ARGUMENT.

THE BALANCED QUALITY ALSO APPLIES TO THE RATIO BETWEEN MANPOWER
AND TANKS.

IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE GSFG HAS THE
CHARACTER OF AN EXPEDITION FORCE WITH AN OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE AND
HAS SECURE AND EFFICIENT LAND CONNECTIONS WITH THE SU.

AS A RESULT THE SOVIET TROOPS IN THE NGA CAN AFFORD A HIGH
PERCENTAGE OF COMBAT UNITS, ESPECIALLY TANK UNITS (GSFG EQUALS 50
PER CENT) WITH A SMALL LOGISTIC COMPONENT (" TEETH TO TAIL RATIO").
THIS APPLIES IN A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED FORM ALSO TO THE ARMIES
OF THE NSWP-STATES IN THE NGA WHICH FOLLOW CLOSELY SOVIET
COMMAND PRINCIPLES.

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IN CONTRAST, BECAUSE OF THE WESTERN DEFENSIVE CONCEPT NATO GROUND FORCES REQUIRE MORE HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED, MORE FLEXIBLE AND MORE INFANTRY-WEARY UNITS WHICH HAVE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH A STRONG ANTI-TANK COMPONENT. THIS IS THE REASON WHY IN SUCH AN ARMY THE MEN PER TANK RATIO IS HIGHER. HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLE OF STRUCTURAL BALANCE IS VALID FOR THIS DIFFERENT RATIO AS WELL.

9. IN THE CASE OF BOTH THE WP AND NATO DIFFERING BUT CONSTANT RATIOS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED AS PREREQUISITES FOR BALANCED STRUCTURES, WHICH IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FOLLOWING COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BUNDESWEHR AND THE WP.

	GROUND FORCES	MEN	TANKS
BW (BUNDESWEHR)	318 039	69,1	
NVA (GDR ARMY)	100 000	36,1	
CVA (CZECH ARMY)	130 000	31,7	
PVA (POLISH ARMY)	190 000	51,4	
SOVIET GROUND			
FORCES IN NGA	495 940	43,6	

10 AS THE ABOVE TABLE SUGGESTS, THE MEN-TO-TANK-RATIO IN THE BUNDESWEHR IS CLEARLY HIGHER THAN THE CORRESPONDING RATIO IN THE WP FORCES. THIS DISTINCTION IS DUE TO A DIFFERENT DOCTRINE: FOLLOWING WESTERN AND IN PARTICULAR GERMAN CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS, MAJOR FORMATIONS OF BRIGADE LEVEL AND HIGHER MUST BE CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING OPERATIONS INDEPENDENTLY, SINCE IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS THEY HAVE TO OFFSET NUMERICAL INFERIORITY BY GREATER OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY. HOWEVER, THE CONDUCT OF INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS CALLS FOR A GREATER NUMBER OF PERSONNEL FOR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

THESE DESIDERATA HAVE YIELDED AN "OPTIMUM MIKS" OF THE MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT LEVELS OF MAJOR FORMATIONS, A MIKS IN WHICH CHANGES IN ONE COMPONENT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE OTHER SYSTEM COMPONENTS.

11. SINCE BOTH SIDES REGARD THE EXISTING PERSONNEL-EQUIPMENT RATIO AS OPTIMAL ONE CAN SAY THAT A REDUCTION AS WELL AS A LIMITATION OF MANPOWER WOULD RESULT IN A LIMITATION OF READY AND AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT. CONSIDERING THE PERSONNEL-EQUIPMENT RATIO IN THE WP THE POSSIBILITY AND-OR PROBABILITY OF USING MANPOWER OVERAGES FOR REDUCTIONS AND TO MINIMIZE THE IMMEDIATE SECRET

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EFFECT OF PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS ON TANKS THROUGH A PARTICULARLY LARGE REDUCTION OF THE SUPPORT COMPONENT ARE RELATIVELY SMALL IN THE CASE OF THE WP. MOREOVER, THE FACT THAT ESPECIALLY THE SUPPORT COMPONENTS OF THE NSWP ARMIES DRAW HEAVILY ON CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHICH CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS ALSO DOES HAVE A BEARING. IN ADDITION, THE "WELFARE" AND

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPONENTS OF THE WP GROUND FORCES ARE MUCH LESS LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN NON-BALANCED PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPONENTS IN WESTERN ARMIES. IN THE WP THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED AS INDISPENSABLE INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL.

12. IN DETAIL WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SITUATION:

A) ASSUMING THAT REDUCTIONS WILL APPLY ONLY TO SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA AND THAT THEY ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A RATIO OF 43,6 : 1 FOR MEN : TANKS, A REDUCTION OF 70.000 MEN WOULD RESULT IN THE DE-ACTIVATION (OR A COMPARABLE MEASURE) OF 1.605 TANKS WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO AMOUNT TO 14,1 PER CENT OF SOVIET TANKS IN THE NGA:

70.000 MEN --- 1.605 TANKS EQUAL 14,1 PERCENT

B) ASSUMING THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD AFFECT NSWP GROUND FORCES ONLY AND THAT THEY ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A RATIO OF 39,7 : 1 MEN : -TANKS WE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING FIGURES:

70.000 MEN --- 1.763 TANKS EQUAL 16,7 PER CENT

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TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /083 W

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13. IF THESE FIGURES ARE APPLIED TO ARMOURED FORMATIONS WE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A) SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA

THE 1.605 TANKS WHICH CORRESPOND TO A REDUCTION OF 70.000 MEN ARE EQUIVALENT TO THE TANKS IN 3.1 TANK DIVISIONS PLUS 2.5 MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS OR THE NUMBER OF TANKS OF A TANK ARMY IN THE GSFG.

B) NSWP GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA

THE FIGURES IN THIS CASE ARE BETWEEN 0.7 AND 1.0 DIVISION
SLICES HIGHER THAN IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE NGA.
THE DIFFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF A REDUCTION BY 70.000 MEN IS
AS FOLLOWS:

SOA - NGA: -- 1.605 TANKS -- 3,1 TANKDIV PLUS 2,5 MRD EQUALS 5,6 DIV

NSWP-NGA: -- 1.763 TANNNS -- 3,5 TANKDIV PLUS 2,8 MRD EQUALS 6,3 DIV

ROEM3 -- CONCLUSIONS--

14. PROVIDET THAT

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- THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT ON A MANPOWER NON-INCREASE IN
PHASE ONE AND A COMMON COLLECTIVE MANPOWER CEILING IN PHASE TWO
- FORCES IN THE NGA MAINTAIN THE PRESENT STRUCTURAL BALANCE
PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS ALONE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RESULT IN DE FACTO
TANK REDUCTIONS-DE-ACTIVATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. THE RATIO BETWEEN
MANPOWER AND TANK REDUCTIONS WOULD ROUGHLY CORRESPOND TO THE
EXSISTING RATIO MANPOWER : TANKS (EXSAMPLE: WITHDRAWAL OF
70.000 SOVIET PERSONNEL WOULD AFFECT THE COMBAT READINESS OF
FROM 1,500 TO 1,800 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS).

15. BY ANALOGY IT CAN BE SAID:

PERSONNEL LIMITATIONS WOULD ON BOTH SIDES HAVE A
COMPARABLE EFFECT ON THE CEILING OF COMBAT READY TANKS SINCE,
WHEN APPLYING THE ARGUMENT FOR REDUCTIONS, THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF MANPOWER CEILINGS WOULD MEAN THAT ONLY A CERTAIN MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS CAN BE MANNED AND MAINTAINED.

"MODEST INCREASES" WOULD REMAIN POSSIBLE. THE SIZE OF
THESE "MODEST INCREASES", HOWEVER, WOULD REMAIN BELOW AN
INCREASE THAT COULD UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT.

16. IT THEREFORE FOLLOWS:

THE CONCENTRATION ON MANPOWER REDUCTIONS-LIMITATIONS AND
THE INSISTENCE ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE MANPOWER
CEILING HAS IMPLICATIONSON THE EQUIPMENT COMPONENT OF THE
ARMED FORCES. WHEN HAVING TO REACT TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR
EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS AND-OR LIMITATIONS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS
EUROPEAN FORCES, THIS FACT COULD BE WELL SUBSTANTIATED AND
PRESENTED AS A COUNTER PROPOSAL. IN OUR OPINION IT IS THE
ONLY ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD SAFEGUARD THE FLEXSIBILITY OF
THE WEST WITH REGARD TO EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF OUR ARMED
FORCES AND WOULD AVOID CONSEQUENCES ON EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS IN
EUROPE (SPECIAL STATUS, DROIT DE REGARD OF THE WP CONCERNING
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, CODIFICATION OF DISPARITIES) WHICH WOULD
BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO03764
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197507102/abbrzlap.tel
Line Count: 325
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: OPTION III: FRG PAPER ON RELATIONSHIP OF MANPOWER TO TANKS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA
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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006